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Introduction 
 At the beginning of his great and influential essay, “Death,” Thomas Nagel 
writes, “If death is the unequivocal and permanent end of our existence, the question 
arises whether it is a bad thing to die” (Nagel 1970: 73). Most of us do in fact believe that 
death can, at least in some cases, be bad for the one who dies. In other words, most of us 
think that death can harm the deceased. (Note: I take the expressions the badness of 
death, on the one hand, and the harm of death, on the other hand, to be roughly 
equivalent, so I will use these and related expressions interchangeably.) Now, of course, 
one reason that some of us believe that death can be bad is that some of us believe that 
death is not the end; some of us believe in an afterlife, where some of those who have 
died will experience punishments involving suffering (which, we can all agree, would be 
a bad thing). Others of us share Nagel’s assumption that death is the permanent end of 
our existence, not something we will experience but rather an experiential blank. For the 
purposes of this chapter, let’s assume that Nagel is right about this and that death really is 
the end. (If you don’t share this assumption, you can imagine this chapter as exploring a 
hypothetical scenario: what would you say about the harm of death if you didn’t believe 
in an afterlife?) Nevertheless, most of us want to say that death is one of the greatest evils 
that can befall a person. As it turns out, it is quite puzzling to explain how death could 
harm the deceased, given that the deceased no longer exists, and there are interesting and 
difficult challenges to the belief that it is even possible for death to harm the deceased. 
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 Before we continue, however, three clarifications are in order. First, when we talk 
about the harm or badness of death, we are talking about a state of nonexistence—the 
state that follows a person’s life and that begins when the person has ceased living. We 
must not confuse death with dying, the latter of which is what happens during the end of a 
person’s life, before the person has died. It is not very puzzling how dying can be bad for 
a person who is experiencing it, since dying all too often includes suffering. Second, the 
philosophical issues considered here are concerned with the possibility of death’s badness 
for the deceased and not for, say, the person’s loved ones who continue to exist after the 
person’s death. Here again, it is not very puzzling how a person’s death can be bad for 
that person’s loved ones, since they will very likely experience suffering as a result. 
Lastly, in discussing how death harms the deceased, we are going to be concerned with 
how death can harm the deceased. In other words, our concern is whether or not is it even 
possible for death to harm the deceased. Thus, even if we decide that death can be bad for 
the one who dies, we are not thereby committed to the claim that death is always bad—
that it is bad in every case. It might turn out that death always harms the deceased, but 
perhaps not. Our concern is how death could harm the deceased. 
 So, given that death is an experiential blank, can death be bad for the one who 
dies? There are two main answers to this question in the contemporary philosophical 
literature on the philosophy of death. The first says that it is possible for death to be bad 
for the one who dies and that it is bad insofar as it deprives the deceased of goods that 
would have been enjoyed by that person had the person not died. For obvious reasons, 
this view is called the deprivation account, and it has several defenders (see, for example, 
Feldman 1992; Bradley 2009; and Fischer 2009), though the details of their accounts 
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vary. If you are like me and find yourself with the belief that death can, at least in some 
cases, be bad for the one who dies, then the deprivation account may strike you as 
obviously true, or at least as very plausible. According to the deprivation account, death 
harms the deceased by taking away opportunities to continue enjoying the goods of life. 
This might happen by depriving the deceased of potential pleasures, such as the pleasures 
of eating good food or of listening to music, or it might happen by depriving the deceased 
of opportunities for certain desires to be satisfied, such as the desire to write a book or to 
see one’s grandchildren graduate college. In any case, according to the deprivation 
account, death can harm the deceased, and it does so by depriving her of various goods. 
 The second main answer to the question of whether death can be bad is called 
Epicureanism, named after Epicurus, an Ancient Greek philosopher, and this view 
denies, as Epicurus himself did, that death can be bad for the one who dies. On this view, 
there is no case of death that harms the deceased. Again, if you are like me and find it 
plausible that death can be bad, then Epicureanism might strike you as obviously false, or 
at least as very implausible. But it turns out that there are several Epicurean challenges to 
the deprivation account—arguments for the conclusion that death is never bad for the one 
who dies. Indeed, in the essay mentioned above, Nagel suggests four potential challenges 
to the deprivation account (Nagel actually counts them as three, but the second involves 
two distinct challenges), and the remainder of this chapter will consider both how those 
four challenges could be regimented into arguments for Epicureanism and also how the 
deprivation account could respond to each. The first three (the “No-Harm-Done 
Argument,” the “No-Subject Argument,” and the “Timing Argument”) are suggested by 
Epicurus himself, and the fourth (the “Symmetry Argument”), which has recently 
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generated a lively discussion, is suggested by Lucretius, an Ancient Roman philosopher 
who was himself an Epicurean. As we consider each argument, I will highlight 
contributions to this debate from Nagel’s classic essay, but I will also discuss, especially 
in connection with the Symmetry Argument, some more recent developments. 
The No-Harm-Done Argument 
 The first Epicurean challenge that Nagel mentions concerns whether anything can 
be bad for someone without being experienced as bad by that person (Nagel 1970: 75-
76). Epicurus puts the challenge this way in his Letter to Menoeceus: “Accustom yourself 
to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil lie in sensation, whereas 
death is the absence of sensation...Therefore that most frightful of evils, death, is nothing 
to us” (Long and Sedley 1987: 149-150). On Epicurus’s own view, in order for a thing to 
be evil (or to count as bad for a person), that thing must involve some unpleasant 
sensation—it must involve some pain. But since, on Epicurus’s view, death doesn’t 
involve any pain, he concludes that death cannot be bad for the one who dies. We could 
put Epicurus’s argument, the No-Harm-Done Argument, like this (for discussion of a 
similar argument, see Feldman 1992, chapter 8): 
1) Everything that is bad for a person consists in sensation. 
2) A person who has died cannot have any sensations. 
3) Therefore, death cannot be bad for the one who dies. 
The No-Harm-Done Argument is valid, which is to say that the conclusion (3) follows 
from the premises (1)-(2). The question we need to ask, then, is: are the premises true? 
Given our assumption about death being a permanent experiential blank, we are 
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committed to the truth of (2); you can’t have sensations if you don’t exist. So it looks like 
the deprivation account must somehow deny (1), and this is exactly what Nagel does. 
 Imagine the following scenario: unbeknownst to you, your closest friends have 
recently spread lies about you to everyone else you know, including the members of your 
family and your other close friends, thereby betraying your friendship. Imagine, further, 
that they have been very careful in spreading the lies behind your back, making sure that 
you never find out about the lies and that you never notice that anyone treats you 
differently as a result of having heard the lies about you. Do you think that, in such a 
case, it would be a bad thing for you that you had been betrayed, even though you won’t 
ever find out about the betrayal or suffer as a result? Most people, I think, would say that 
this betrayal would be bad for the one betrayed; if so, however, then premise (1) must be 
false, for we’ve found a case in which something is bad for a person without consisting of 
sensation. In other words, if it can be bad for you that your friends spread lies behind 
your back without you ever finding out, then something can be bad for you even though 
you never have any unpleasant sensations—you never find out about the lies and thus 
never feel any pain. Nagel argues that such cases are indeed bad (Nagel 1970: 76-78), 
and thus he would say that premise (1) must be false; there can be bads (or harms) that 
befall us without our experiencing them as bad. It looks, then, as though the deprivation 
account has an adequate response to the No-Harm-Done Argument. 
 Now, of course, one response on behalf of Epicureanism is to deny that this case 
of betrayal really is bad for the one who is betrayed but never finds out about it. I do not 
find this response very plausible, but I suppose that Epicureans could dig in their heels on 
this point. It is worth noting, though, that this would be a very striking result, for there are 
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many cases in which we take something to be bad for someone who never experiences 
the thing as bad, such as when a person’s right to privacy is violated without that person’s 
knowledge (Nozick 1999). (For a discussion of this and similar cases, see Fischer 2009, 
chapter 1, and also Fischer 2014.) For this reason, I don’t find this response very 
plausible. A different Epicurean response, however, would be to argue that the betrayal 
case is not relevantly similar to the case of death. An Epicurean might argue as follows. 
In the betrayal case, it is at least possible for the one betrayed to discover what’s 
happened and thus experience the badness of being betrayed; but in the case of death, it is 
not even possible for the deceased to have any experience of the supposed badness of 
death; thus (the Epicurean concludes), even if the betrayal really is bad for the one 
betrayed, it doesn’t follow that death can be bad for the deceased. 
 How might someone defending the deprivation account respond? One way is to 
construct another case—one in which a person is harmed even though it isn’t possible for 
the person to experience the harm. John Martin Fischer aims to do exactly this in his 
modified version of the betrayal case: 
You are betrayed behind your back by people who you thought were good friends, 
and you never actually find out about this or have any bad experiences as a result 
of the betrayal. But now suppose that these friends were (very) worried that you 
might find out about the betrayal. In order to guard against this possibility, they 
arrange for White to watch over you. His task is to prevent you ever from finding 
out about the betrayal. So, for example, if one of the individuals who betrayed 
you should decide to tell you about it, White can prevent him from succeeding: 
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White can do whatever is required to prevent the information from getting to you. 
(Fischer 2009: 39) 
In the modified version of the betrayal case, it is not possible (in the relevant sense) for 
you to find out about the betrayal because White ensures that this information never 
reaches you. Still, it certainly seems like this case of betrayal is bad for you, despite the 
fact that it isn’t possible for you to experience the betrayal as bad. And this case is more 
similar to the case of death; in both the modified betrayal case and the case of death, it is 
not possible for the person to experience the relevant items (betrayal, on the one hand, 
and death, on the other) as bad. But, the proponent of the deprivation approach could say, 
if we accept that the betrayal is bad for you, despite the impossibility that you experience 
it as bad, then we should say that death can be bad for the deceased, despite the 
impossibility that the deceased experiences it as bad. 
 Again, an Epicurean could bite the bullet and deny that this case of betrayal is 
really bad for the one betrayed, but this is very counterintuitive and would imply, as I 
mentioned above, that many cases in which we ordinarily assume that something is bad 
for someone (such as certain violations of privacy) would turn out to be different than we 
thought. An alternative Epicurean strategy is to maintain that there is some relevant 
difference between the case of death and the other cases considered (such that, while the 
latter can be bad for the person involved, the former cannot). One way to continue 
pursuing this strategy is to focus on the fact that, while there is a possible subject of the 
harm in the betrayal cases, there is no possible subject of the alleged harm in the case of 
death. This leads us to the next challenge. 
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The No-Subject Argument 
 The second challenge is also inspired by Epicurus’s Letter to Menoeceus: 
“Therefore that most frightful of evils, death, is nothing to us, seeing that when we exist 
death is not present, and when death is present we do not exist. Thus it is nothing to either 
the living or the dead, seeing that the former do not have it and the latter no longer exist” 
(Long and Sedley 1987: 150). The passage just quoted is very suggestive and might be 
read in a number of ways, but there are two interpretations worth considering here (these 
two interpretations are also discussed in Kagan 2012, chapter 10): first, Epicurus is 
emphasizing that there is no subject of the harm of death, and thus that death can’t be bad 
(this is the challenge considered in this section); second, Epicurus is emphasizing that 
there is no time at which death harms anyone, and thus that death can’t be bad (this is the 
challenge considered in the next section). 
 On the first reading of the passage, Epicurus is claiming that a person must exist 
in order for anything to be bad for that person. Martha Nussbaum, who has written much 
on Epicurus and Lucretius and their arguments, has formulated this type of Epicurean 
argument, the No-Subject Argument, as follows: 
1) An event can be good or bad for someone only if, at the time when the event is 
present, that person exists as a subject of at least possible experience, so that it is 
at least possible that the person experiences the event. 
2) The time after a person dies [that is, death] is a time at which that person does 
not exist as a subject of possible experience. 
3) Hence the condition of being dead [that is, death] is not bad for that person. 
(Nussbaum 1994: 201-202) 
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The No-Subject Argument, just like the No-Harm-Done Argument that we’ve already 
considered, is valid; so, in order to respond to the argument, we need to show which 
premise is false. As with the No-Harm-Done Argument, premise (2) of the No-Subject 
Argument follows from our assumption about death being a permanent experiential 
blank; we’re assuming that death is the end, so once the deceased is in fact deceased, she 
no longer exists as the subject of possible experience. Thus, to avoid the Epicurean 
conclusion, the deprivation account must deny (1).  
 One way to motivate the denial of (1) is to appeal to examples like the ones 
considered in the previous section (involving betrayal) and to argue that death is not 
relevantly different from such cases even though there is no subject of possible 
experience in the case of death. Consider the following example introduced by Nagel:  
Suppose an intelligent person receives a brain injury that reduces him to the 
mental condition of a contented infant, and that such desires as remain to him can 
be satisfied by a custodian, so that he is free from care. Such a development 
would be widely regarded as a severe misfortune, not only for his friends and 
relations, or for society, but also, and primarily, for the person himself. This does 
not mean that a contented infant is unfortunate. The intelligent adult who has been 
reduced to this condition is the subject of the misfortune. He is the one we pity, 
though of course he does not mind his condition—there is some doubt, in fact, 
whether he can be said to exist any longer. (Nagel 1970: 77) 
As with the betrayal cases, it looks as though this case shows that something can be bad 
for a person even if that person cannot experience the thing as bad. The new case, 
however, is not very different from the case of death; the intelligent adult who is reduced 
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to the mental state of an infant, even if he still exists (which, as Nagel notes, may be 
doubted), has apparently been harmed in a way that he can no longer appreciate. And 
since this case is not very different from the case of death, it looks as though the 
proponent of the deprivation account can maintain that a person need not exist as a 
subject of possible experience in order to be harmed, which is to say that premise (1) is 
false. 
 But, it may be argued, a problem with this new example, as well as the betrayal 
cases, is that they remain importantly different from the case of death insofar as they 
involve subjects of possible experience, whereas the deceased is not the subject of 
possible experience. Indeed, Nussbaum argues that, in the case of the adult whose mental 
capacity is reduced, “it is hard not to feel that the continued existence of the damaged 
person, who is continuous with and very plausibly identical with the former adult, gives 
the argument that the adult has suffered a loss at least a part of its force” (Nussbaum 
1994: 206). According to Nussbaum, we simply can’t extrapolate from cases involving a 
subject (like betrayals or cases of mental loss) to the case of death, for it is precisely this 
feature of death (that there is no subject when it has occurred) that prevents it from being 
a harm. We could put this Epicurean defense of the No-Subject Argument as follows: the 
strategy for denying premise (1) that we are considering begins by appealing to a non-
death example of alleged harm and then argues that the case of death is not relevantly 
different (and so it can harm the deceased); but if the strategy appeals to any example of 
alleged harm other than death, then there must be a subject of possible experience in that 
example (since it isn’t a case of death); and if there is a subject, then the case is 
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importantly different from the case of death (in which there is no subject); so this strategy 
can’t establish that death harms the deceased despite there being no subject. 
 One way to respond on behalf of the deprivation account is to consider examples 
in which it is intuitive that, though a person has died (and thus is no longer the subject of 
possible experiences), something done after that person’s death can nevertheless harm 
them. Imagine that, after a famous author’s death, everyone comes to believe (falsely) 
that her books were written by her brother, who died in Mexico long before the books 
were published (Nagel 1970: 76). Or, to take a case from Nussbaum’s more recent work, 
in which she makes some concessions concerning such cases: 
Suppose that Virgil’s Aeneid had been burned at his death (as, in fact, he is said to 
have requested). Then the posthumous story of Virgil’s importance for the whole 
history of literature, art, and thought would have been completely different. It is 
not implausible, I think, to view these posthumous events as altering the 
significance of Virgil’s life of striving; that life is now rightly seen as a fantastic 
success, and some of that achievement consists in altering the way millions of 
people think about life. (Nussbaum 2013: 33) 
As Nussbaum notes, it is not implausible that the significance of Virgil’s life would have 
been affected by the burning of the Aeneid at his death. Moreover, it is not implausible 
that this would have been bad for Virgil, despite the fact that he would never have 
experienced anything differently had it happened. Similarly, if an author posthumously 
loses her fame as a result of widespread false belief about the authorship of her books, 
this would be bad for that author, despite her nonexistence after her death. If it is true that 
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these subject-less cases involve harms, then premise (1) of the No-Subject Argument is 
false.  
 At this point, a convinced Epicurean would, of course, deny that there really are 
any posthumous harms in these cases. From the Epicurean point of view, it makes no 
difference to Virgil what happens after he dies, for he isn’t around to be affected by it! 
And this leaves us roughly where we started: the Epicurean and the proponent of the 
deprivation approach simply disagree about the various examples (including the case of 
death), and it appears that neither side can convince the other to change positions. (This is 
an instance of what Fischer calls a “dialectical stalemate.” For a nice discussion of this 
dialectical situation, see Fischer 2009, chapter 7.) How should we proceed from here? 
One way to attempt to make progress would be to consider more examples with the hope 
of discovering one that will do the trick, convincing the Epicurean that premise (1) of the 
No-Subject Argument is false. Another way forward is to move on, evaluating other 
arguments for Epicureanism. Let’s proceed in the latter way. 
The Timing Argument 
 In the previous section, I mentioned that there were two ways to read a certain 
passage from Epicurus. Here is the passage: “Therefore that most frightful of evils, death, 
is nothing to us, seeing that when we exist death is not present, and when death is present 
we do not exist. Thus it is nothing to either the living or the dead, seeing that the former 
do not have it and the latter no longer exist” (Long and Sedley 1987: 150). We 
considered the first reading (with an emphasis on there being no subject of death) in the 
previous section; the second reading has it that Epicurus is emphasizing that there is no 
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time at which death harms anyone, and thus that death can’t be bad. Following Jens 
Johansson, we might formulate Epicurus’s argument, the Timing Argument, as follows: 
1) Anything that is bad for a person is bad for her at a time. 
2) There is no time at which death is bad for the person who dies. 
3) Hence, death is not bad for the person who dies. (Johansson 2013b: 255) 
As with the previous arguments, the Timing Argument is valid. In this case, however, one 
can resist either premise without giving up any of the assumptions with which we began. 
On the one hand, one can deny premise (1), claiming instead that death can be bad for a 
person without being bad for her at a time. This view has been dubbed “atemporalism” 
(Johansson 2013b). On the other hand, on can deny premise (2), claiming instead that 
there is a time at which death can be bad for the deceased. Since there are several 
candidate times for the badness of death, there are several possible ways to reject premise 
(2) of the Timing Argument. Following Steven Luper, we can identify and label the 
possible views on the timing of the badness of a person’s death as follows: “eternalism” 
says that death is bad at all times; “subsequentism” says that death is bad after the person 
has died; “concurrentism” says that death is bad at the time of death (where death is the 
first moment of the person’s nonexistence); and “priorism” says that death is bad before 
the person dies (Luper 2009). Yet another possible view, endorsed by Nagel, is 
“indefinitism,” according to which the time of the badness of death is indefinite (Luper 
2009). Since I don’t have the space to evaluate each of these possible responses to the 
argument here, I will instead focus on Nagel’s claims concerning the timing of the harm 
of death. (For a thorough discussion of the other positions, see Johansson 2013b.) 
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 Recall the case we considered in the previous section involving an intelligent 
adult who is (tragically) reduced to the mental state of an infant. Concerning this case, 
Nagel says: 
This case should convince us that it is arbitrary to restrict the goods and evils that 
can befall a man to nonrelational properties ascribable to him at particular times. 
As it stands, that restriction excludes not only such cases of gross degeneration, 
but also a good deal of what is important about success and failure, and other 
features of a life that have the character of processes. I believe we can go further, 
however. There are goods and evils which are irreducibly relational; they are 
features of the relations between a person, with spatial and temporal boundaries of 
the usual sort, and circumstances which may not coincide with him either in space 
or in time. A man’s life includes much that does not transpire within the 
boundaries of his body and his mind, and what happens to him can include much 
that does not take place within the boundaries of his life. These boundaries are 
commonly crossed by the misfortunes of being deceived, or despised, or betrayed. 
(If this is correct, there is a simple account of what is wrong with breaking a 
deathbed promise. It is an injury to the dead man. For certain purposes it is 
possible to regard time as just another type of distance.) (Nagel 1970: 77-78) 
It is relatively simple, according to Nagel, to determine the boundaries, both spatial and 
temporal, of a human being. Still, Nagel thinks, much of a person’s life, including what 
happens to the person, lies outside of those boundaries. Much of Virgil’s life, for 
example, depended on his Aeneid not being burned upon his death; in fact, the event of 
Virgil’s wishes being ignored (concerning the burning of his Aeneid) is something that 
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happened to Virgil, despite the fact that this event occurred outside the temporal 
boundaries of Virgil’s life. As Nagel puts it, we can think of cases in which some later 
event affects the deceased (either by harming or benefitting the deceased) as instances of 
temporal distance. Just as I can be harmed by an event that occurs spatially distant from 
me (such as when my bicycle is stolen while I am away), so too, on Nagel’s view, I can 
be harmed by an event that occurs at some temporal distance from me. 
 Talk of temporal distance might suggest subsequentism about the timing of 
death’s badness (the view that death harms the deceased after her death), but Nagel’s 
view is that the harm does not have so specific a temporal location even if both the 
person harmed and the event that brings about the harm (death) do have specific temporal 
locations. (For an endorsement of subsequentism that makes reference to temporal 
distance, though, see Fischer 2009, chapter 3.) According to Nagel: 
When a man dies we are left with his corpse, and while a corpse can suffer the 
kind of mishap that may occur to an article of furniture, it is not a suitable object 
for pity. The man, however, is. He has lost his life, and if he had not died, he 
would have continued to live it, and to possess whatever good there is in 
living…[A]lthough the spatial and temporal locations of the individual who 
suffered the loss are clear enough, the misfortune itself cannot be so easily 
located. One must be content just to state that his life is over and there will never 
be any more of it. That fact, rather than his past or present condition, constitutes 
his misfortune, if it is one. Nevertheless if there is a loss, someone must suffer it, 
and he must have existence and specific spatial and temporal location even if the 
loss itself does not. (Nagel 1970: 78) 
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The harm (or misfortune) of death, on Nagel’s view, need not have a specific 
spatiotemporal location in order to be a genuine harm to the deceased. In other words, we 
may not be able to pinpoint the exact temporal location of death’s harm to the deceased, 
but we can nevertheless maintain that death is a harm to the deceased despite the fact that 
the event of death (which results in the harm) is temporally distant from the deceased. 
Thus, on Nagel’s view, premise (2) of the Timing Argument is false; even if the timing of 
the harm of death is indeterminate, it does not follow that there is no time at which death 
harms the deceased. 
The Symmetry Argument 
 Even if each of the challenges that we’ve considered can be met, however, the one 
that remains to be considered is perhaps the most difficult challenge for the deprivation 
account. This last challenge is suggested by Lucretius in his De Rerum Natura:  
Look back now and consider how the bygone ages of eternity that elapsed before 
our birth were nothing to us. Here, then, is a mirror in which nature shows us the 
time to come after our death. Do you see anything fearful in it? Do you perceive 
anything grim? Does it not appear more peaceful than the deepest sleep? (DRN 
972-977, trans. Martin Ferguson Smith) 
According to Lucretius, there is a certain symmetry between the time before we exist 
(which we can call our prenatal, or pre-vital, nonexistence) and the time after we exist 
(which we can call our posthumous nonexistence, or simply death); in both cases, we do 
not exist. But, Lucretius argues, since there is nothing grim about our prenatal 
nonexistence, and since our posthumous nonexistence is not relevantly different, we 
should have the same view of our posthumous nonexistence. (Note that, while Lucretius 
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seems primarily concerned with whether or not we should fear death, I have been setting 
aside questions about the fear of death in this chapter to focus on whether death can be 
bad. These sets of questions are related, to be sure, and answers to one set of questions 
may be relevant to the other set, but we can keep them separate for our purposes here and 
consider a version of Lucretius’s argument that focuses on death’s badness.) We could 
articulate Lucretius’s argument, the Symmetry Argument, as follows:  
1) Prenatal nonexistence is not bad for the person who comes into existence. 
2) There is no relevant difference (with respect to badness) between prenatal 
nonexistence and posthumous nonexistence (death). 
3) Thus, death is not bad for the one who dies. 
On my view, the Symmetry Argument is the most interesting and challenging weapon in 
the Epicurean arsenal. Both of the premises are very plausible, and the inference from 
those premises to the conclusion appears valid. How might a proponent of the deprivation 
account respond to the Symmetry Argument? 
 One possible response is to reject premise (1), thereby accepting the 
counterintuitive position that prenatal nonexistence is bad for the person who comes into 
existence. Fred Feldman commends this approach: 
There are, after all, two ways in which we can rectify the apparently irrational 
emotional asymmetry. On the one hand, we can follow Lucretius and cease 
viewing early death as a bad thing for [the deceased]. On the other hand, we can 
at least try to start viewing late birth as a bad thing. My suggestion is that in the 
present case, the latter course would be preferable. (Feldman 1991: 223) 
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If one accepts premise (2) of the Symmetry Argument, one could nevertheless reject the 
Epicurean conclusion that death can’t harm the deceased. The catch, of course, is that 
doing so while maintaining (2) requires accepting, as Feldman does, that our prenatal 
nonexistence is bad for us. On this approach, one denies both premise (1) and the 
conclusion (3) of the Symmetry Argument. While I don’t have a knockdown argument 
against this approach, I find it difficult to accept that my own prenatal nonexistence is 
bad for me. Hence, I’m motivated to look elsewhere for a response to the argument. 
 On my view, a more promising response to the Symmetry Argument is to argue 
that there is some asymmetry overlooked by the argument and thus that, in fact, premise 
(2) is false. In particular, a proponent of the deprivation account could argue that death 
deprives us of something which prenatal nonexistence does not. This is how Nagel 
responds to the Symmetry Argument: 
It is true that both the time before a man’s birth and the time after his death are 
times when he does not exist. But the time after his death is time of which his 
death deprives him. It is time in which, had he not died then, he would be 
alive…But we cannot say that the time prior to a man’s birth is time in which he 
would have lived had he been born not then but earlier. For aside from the brief 
margin permitted by premature labor, he could not have been born earlier: anyone 
born substantially earlier than he was would have been someone else. Therefore 
the time prior to his birth is not time in which his subsequent birth prevents him 
from living. (Nagel 1970: 79) 
Nagel’s suggestion is that, while death can deprived the deceased of goods (and thereby 
harm the deceased), prenatal nonexistence does not deprive anyone of any goods, since 
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anyone who was born earlier enough to receive any extra goods would not be the same 
person. On Nagel’s view, then, there is an important asymmetry between prenatal and 
posthumous nonexistence; if prenatal nonexistence were to end earlier (that is, if one 
came into existence earlier), it would be a different person that came into existence, 
whereas if posthumous nonexistence were to begin later (that is, if a person were to die 
later), it would be the same person who would be able to enjoy more goods of life. Thus, 
Nagel thinks, one can accept premise (1) of the Symmetry Argument (which says that 
prenatal nonexistence is not bad) without accepting the Epicurean conclusion that death 
can’t be bad for the deceased.  
 A common objection to Nagel’s suggestion is that it depends on the claim that it 
is not possible for a person to come into existence earlier than that person actually comes 
into existence. This apparently relies on a strict version of what is sometimes called an 
“essentiality of origins” thesis, according to which it is essential to a person that she 
develops from a particular fertilized egg that comes into existence at a particular time—
any other fertilized egg, or the same fertilized egg but that came into existence at any 
other time, would necessarily be a different person, on this view. I find this strict 
essentiality of origins thesis incredibly implausible, and (perhaps unsurprisingly) it is 
very controversial. Consider a case suggested by Fischer: a fertilized egg is frozen and 
thawed out at a later time (many years later, say). For the individual who develops from 
this fertilized egg, it was possible that she be born earlier, since she could have been 
thawed out sooner (Fischer 2009: 65-66). Nagel himself confesses to being troubled by 
his response to the Symmetry Argument, partly because of this kind of worry. When his 
essay was reprinted in his book Mortal Questions, he added a footnote to suggest a 
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different response: “I suspect that [a response to the Symmetry Argument] requires a 
general treatment of the difference between past and future in our attitudes toward our 
own lives. Our attitudes toward past and future pain are very different, for example. 
Derek Parfit’s writings on this topic have revealed its difficulty to me” (Nagel 1979: 9). 
Rather than attempting to show that it isn’t possible to be born earlier, as he had 
suggested at first, Nagel’s second suggestion, inspired by Parfit, is that we look for an 
asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and future events in order to explain how the 
Symmetry Argument fails.  
 So, Nagel has provided two suggestions for responding to the Symmetry 
Argument, the first of which, as he acknowledges, faces some difficulties, and the second 
of which he leaves to be developed. In the remainder of this chapter, I want to explore a 
recent development of each of Nagel’s two suggestions. The first suggestion, according 
to which it isn’t possible to be born earlier, is defended (after some modification) by 
Frederik Kaufman (Kaufman 1999). The second suggestion, according to which there is 
an important asymmetry in our attitudes toward the past and future, is developed and 
defended by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer (Brueckner and Fischer 1986; 
Fischer and Brueckner 2012). Let’s consider each in turn. 
 While Kaufman endorses the criticisms of Nagel’s first suggestion discussed 
above, he nevertheless claims that there is a sense in which it is not possible for us to be 
born substantially earlier than we are in fact born. To see why this is the case, Kaufman 
thinks, we need to distinguish between two senses of the term person (Kaufman 1999: 
11-12). On the one hand, person might refer to a person in the “thin” sense, which picks 
out the metaphysical essence of some human being, whatever that may be (perhaps a 
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certain soul, or a brain, or some such). On the other hand, person might refer to a person 
in the “thick” sense, which picks out one’s subjective sense of self, including one’s 
psychological features (such as memories and character traits). Crucially, a person in the 
“thin” sense could have lived a very different life and thus been a different person in the 
“thick” sense; if someone were to have a very different history, with the result that she 
would have a very different psychological makeup, she would not be the same person in 
the “thick” sense. 
 How is the distinction between “thin” and “thick” persons relevant to the 
Symmetry Argument? Well, on Kaufman’s view, the reason that death can harm the 
deceased is that it can deprive a person, construed in the “thick” sense, of various goods; 
but, according to Kaufman, it isn’t possible for prenatal nonexistence to deprive a person, 
construed in the “thick” sense, of any goods (Kaufman 1999: 12-14). If someone were to 
be born earlier, the result would be a very different “thick” person with a new history, 
different memories, and perhaps even an unfamiliar character. (This is the sense in which 
Kaufman thinks that it isn’t possible to be born substantially earlier than we are in fact 
born.) By contrast, a “thick” person can always, as it were, get “thicker” by accruing new 
psychological features without a loss to what was already part of her “thick” self. So, on 
Kaufman’s view, prenatal nonexistence is not bad for us (construed as “thick” persons), 
but death can be bad for us insofar as it deprives us (again, construed as “thick” persons) 
of various goods. Thus, according to Kaufman, premise (2) of the Symmetry Argument is 
false—there is an asymmetry concerning the badness of the prenatal and posthumous 
nonexistence of “thick” persons. 
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 Before we turn to Nagel’s second suggestion, as developed by Brueckner and 
Fischer, let me mention just one difficulty for Kaufman’s version of Nagel’s first 
suggestion. Kaufman’s proposal can only succeed if the only deprivations that matter to 
us are deprivations of goods for the “thick” persons that we currently are. Kaufman 
thinks that these are, in fact, the deprivations we care about, and this is why he thinks that 
only posthumous (and not prenatal) deprivations can be bad for us. But it is not clear that 
Kaufman is right about this, as it is a very commonplace occurrence for a person to regret 
a past deprivation that would have resulted, had it occurred, in a different “thick” person, 
with various changes to that person’s psychological features. Some children, to take just 
one example, are deprived of a good education, and this can be bad for the children so 
deprived even if they would have been different “thick” persons had they received a 
better education. (For discussion of similar cases, see Fischer 2009, chapter 5.) For this 
reason, I am skeptical that it is merely our “thick” selves that we care about when 
thinking of past and future deprivations. Perhaps we also care about whether our “thin” 
selves are associated with particular “thick” selves. 
 An alternative response to the Symmetry Argument takes Nagel’s second 
suggestion and attempts to show that some asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and 
future events justifies our view that death, but not prenatal nonexistence, can be bad for 
us. Nagel notes that Parfit’s writings on this subject revealed its difficulty to him, and it 
turns out that Parfit’s writings also played a part in Brueckner and Fischer’s development 
of Nagel’s suggestion. On Parfit’s view, we prefer to have our sufferings in our past 
rather than in our future, and it is not obviously irrational for us to regard our past and 
future sufferings asymmetrically. Brueckner and Fischer argue that, while Parfit is right 
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about the asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and future events, the asymmetry 
concerning sufferings is not sufficient to provide an adequate response to the Symmetry 
Argument—in particular, they worry that Parfit’s approach will only apply to bads that 
are experienced as bad (like suffering), which will not apply to the case of death 
(Brueckner and Fischer 1986: 216). Instead, they argue, we need to focus on our attitudes 
toward past and future goods (Brueckner and Fischer 1986: 219).  
 In their first article on the subject, Brueckner and Fischer’s thesis was that 
“[d]eath deprives us of something we care about, whereas prenatal nonexistence deprives 
us of something to which we are indifferent” (Brueckner and Fischer 1986: 219). They 
give the following thought experiment, inspired by some of Parfit’s examples (see Parfit 
1984), to highlight our actual asymmetric attitudes toward past and future goods (such as 
pleasures):  
Imagine that you are in some hospital to test a drug. The drug induces intense 
pleasure for an hour followed by amnesia. You awaken and ask the nurse about 
your situation. She says that either you tried the drug yesterday (and had an hour 
of pleasure) or you will try the drug tomorrow (and will have an hour of pleasure). 
While she checks on your status, it is clear that you prefer to have the pleasure 
tomorrow. (Brueckner and Fischer 1986: 218-219) 
As this case shows, we prefer to have pleasures in our future rather than in our past. 
According to Brueckner and Fischer, this is why we regard death as a harm to the 
deceased but do not regard prenatal nonexistence as bad for anyone; death can deprive us 
of future goods, whereas prenatal nonexistence deprives us of goods to which we are 
indifferent. 
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 So far, however, Lucretius (and other Epicureans) can agree with Brueckner and 
Fischer. It may be the case, Lucretius could say, that we actually have a preference for 
future goods over past goods, but that doesn’t show that it is rational for us to have such 
preference patterns. And if it isn’t rational for us to have such preference patterns, then it 
looks like the Symmetry Argument is untouched by the Brueckner/Fischer approach. In 
response to this and related worries (some raised by Feldman 2011 and Johansson 2013a; 
2014), Fischer and Brueckner have added a “rationality component” to their view: 
“Although we originally put our point in terms of what we took to be people’s actual 
preference patterns, we should have put it in terms of the rationality of such patterns of 
preference” (Fischer and Brueckner 2014: 3; see also Fischer and Brueckner 2012). 
Rather than relying on the asymmetry of the preference patterns with which we happen to 
find ourselves, Fischer and Brueckner maintain that these asymmetrical patterns are 
actually rational for us to have and thus that it is rational for us to regard death as a harm 
to the deceased (since the deceased is deprived of future goods that it is rational to care 
about) without regarding prenatal nonexistence as a similar harm (since it deprives us of 
something it is not rational to care about). And this allows Fischer and Brueckner to deny 
premise (2) of the Symmetry Argument—even though both prenatal and posthumous 
nonexistence can deprive a person of goods, only posthumous nonexistence (that is, 
death) can deprive a person of goods that it is rational to care about, and thus death, but 
not prenatal nonexistence, can harm the deceased. Despite the apparent complexity in 
their approach, I am inclined to think that Fischer and Brueckner’s account best captures 




 As I hope it is clear from this chapter, it is actually quite challenging to defend the 
very natural view that it is possible for death to harm the deceased, assuming that death is 
the end. Given the challenges, one starts to see the attractions of the Epicurean view that 
it isn’t possible for death to harm the deceased. Still, as we have seen, there are ways to 
resist the Epicurean arguments, and I have surveyed Nagel’s influential responses to each 
of the Epicurean challenges he considered in his classic essay on the topic. Whether or 
not such resistance is ultimately successful remains, in my view, one of the most 
interesting debates in contemporary philosophy.  
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